Damir ble trukket et minuspoeng idag for å ta en referanse som ble sagt under session for flere uker siden. Ikke dårlig. Direkte imponerende, faktisk.

MER FUDGE-AUTISME! NUH!


Apokalypse-ekstra: http://www.washingtonpost.com/...rQ_blog.html#excerpt

Andrew Hugh Tavernish - General Melchett, Black Adder Goes Forth (Basert på?)
Hugo Von Dreyer - Captain Kevin Darling, Black Adder Goes Forth (Inspirert av?)

Disse var i vel vaaaageste laget? Eller kanskje ikke? Vet ikke. Hva var det Damir autismerte?

Dette må Lupin skaffe seg http://wulffmorgenthaler.com/strip/2012/01/04/
This message was last edited by the player at 23:20, Sun 05 Feb 2012.

Skal sies at andersen ikke ble trukket minuspoeng for de referansene. Damir tok et quote fra en av anklagene mot ham, en trussel han skal ha rettet mot en bartender i Dixon, og skjønte hvor den var fra.

Hva T-skjortene angår, har man en liten kasse i Dixon, fra noen raid hvor de rensket ut vatikanet.

Martin. Poste mer i Pathfinder. :(

SKAL! Men har oblig denne uka, så vet ikke når jeg har tid til å mekke kart. :(
Link meg til den Idrew tingen igjen plz.

og Andersen, når du blir lærer så MÅ du: http://9gag.com/gag/2421622?ref=fb

NÃ¥r det gjelder rollespille er jeg som "Rain Man".


How to report news:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YtGSXMuWMR4
This message was last edited by the player at 15:43, Mon 06 Feb 2012.

Attend a lecture: Once per week. Velkommen til humaniora!

Aftenposten har en deilig overskrift i dag.
http://www.aftenposten.no/okon...moderen-6757056.html
Consider it fixed!

Bra vi har kirkeministeren til å ordne opp... Er ikke alltid uten risiko å handle når du får 10-12 milliarder i avslag... I India

Ferdig med oblig, blir opptrapping av posting i helga.

Og jeg har ikke ord.... http://www.washingtonpost.com/..._blog.html#pagebreak

Nå skjer det så lite. makan. Oblig eller ei. Dagens dillemma: HORN eller HOGGTENNER.
Kjør debatt.

Hoggtenner. Horn er kjekke å ha når man charger, men ellers er hoggtenner klart mer anvendelige. Også langt mer diskrete. Fangs ftw.

Snublet over denne juvelen. Spent på hvor folk her havner. La oss kjøre poll, så lager jeg et pie-chart når jeg har alle resultatene. Ta test post resultat, nuh! Og ja, det er umulige dillemmaer.

http://crookedtimber.org/2012/...ge-1/#comment-402728

Edit: Jeg har 3 teorier om Märtha Louise:

1) Damen er verdens mest skamløse svindler (Lite trolig, kongelige ligger bra ann økonomisk).

2) Hun er mye, mye galere enn først antatt, direkte psykotisk.

3) Engler eksisterer.
This message was last edited by the GM at 20:41, Thu 16 Feb 2012.

Gøy! Pause fra kaffe og Crusader Kings for å besvare på denne. Må innrømme at jeg rushet igjennom på kafferus og prøvde å være så realistisk som mulig.

You are sitting in an office with your advisor, Maynard. You have been asked to come up with a workable solution for the troika and for Greece, which needs to be politically and economically acceptable to both parties. Maynard’s job is to take your ideas and turn them into a proper proposal to be submitted. He has a long list of decisions for you to make. “First of all”, he says, “we need to decide whether there is any more money on the table. Do you think that Germany (and Netherlands, Finland, etc) can sell any more fiscal transfers to Greece, given their domestic politics?”

 “I think we have to plan on the basis that there isn’t”, turn to 47.

47:
Maynard pulls a face. “Well, at least we’re being politically realistic here. Plan for the worst and hope for the best, I suppose. That really cuts down our options and makes them in general much more unpalatable. I guess the debt strategies boil down to disorderly default, or tough it out”.

 “Well, tough it out it is then”, go to 35.

35:
“Tough guy!”, Maynard grins. “So we’re going to advise Greece to maintain service on the debt, with no external help. In or out of the Euro?”

 “In”, go to 30.

30:
The smile evaporates from Maynard’s face. “We need to be serious here”, he says. “This plan would be very hard on the Greek people indeed. In its favour, this is actually the only success story I can think of – it’s basically what Latvia did. Against it, Greece isn’t Latvia. It has much weaker institutions and it hasn’t just finished a decade of hyper-growth. And lots of people don’t think that Latvia was all that much of a success story. And the debt numbers were a lot better. I think this plan will play well with the harder-nosed members of the troika, but I suspect that the Greek government will run a mile from it. I’ll write it up”.

As he leaves your office, you can hear him muttering “And I suppose it will get you a job in a think tank”.

THE END.

Märtha Louise er jo alltid gøy å høre på, synes selv at vi burde få flere mentalt tilbakestående folk til å underholde oss. Vi kan kombinere Tangerudbakken og Märtha Louise!


You are sitting in an office with your advisor, Maynard. You have been asked to come up with a workable solution for the troika and for Greece, which needs to be politically and economically acceptable to both parties. Maynard’s job is to take your ideas and turn them into a proper proposal to be submitted. He has a long list of decisions for you to make. “First of all”, he says, “we need to decide whether there is any more money on the table. Do you think that Germany (and Netherlands, Finland, etc) can sell any more fiscal transfers to Greece, given their domestic politics?”

 “Yes, I know it’s going to be difficult, but we have to plan on that basis”, turn to 32.

32:
“I’m sure you know what you’re doing”, Maynard says, with perhaps a flicker of sarcasm. “At some point in this process, we may have to start thinking about exactly how much, but let’s put that to one side for the time being. The next decision relates to the Greek current account. Are we going to aim to bring it roughly into balance?”

 “There isn’t a sustainable solution which involves Greece structurally consuming more than it produces. We need to get the economy back into balance”, turn to 14.

14:
“That’s definitely a significant adjustment”, Maynard warns you. “Since Greece ran large structural deficits (which were the counterpart to its fiscal deficit) for most of the 00s, we are basically saying here that we can’t return to the pre-crisis consumption path. This isn’t really a growth-oriented or cyclical policy; we’re trying to smooth the transition to a structurally lower standard of living in Greece. Just to be sure you know that, because it is going to factor into the political decisions later on”.

“I understand”, you answer. “But let’s deal with that later. We need to consider our debt strategy. My proposal is …”

“That the current process is a can-kicking farce. We should just plan for a straightforward default on the debt”, turn to 22.

Maynard gulps. “As you wish. And will Greece be remaining in the Euro?”

“Yes, definitely”, go to 41

Maynard is clearly worried. “This is going to be a very tough sell indeed for the Eurozone partners. You’re asking them to keep Greece in the Euro and keep making either new loans or fiscal transfers, in the context of a disorderly default. Are you sure you don’t want to revisit that decision?”

You silence him with a look. He walks over to the refreshments trolley and pours himself a cup of tea.

“I am not at all sure about this. But let’s fill in the rest of the details. Is the plan going to involve an internal devaluation?”

“Yes. There will need to be wage controls and benefit cuts. We need to get the cost of production in Greece down far enough for it to be able to compete within Europe”, turn to 9.

“Now that, conversely, is going to be a tough sell in Greece. Tea?” While Maynard pours you a cup, he asks about how the fiscal balance is going to be looked after.

“We will draw up a plan to achieve primary balance over the medium term, and negotiate with our EU partners for the deficit financing required”, turn to 37.

37:
Maynard’s nose wrinkles. “Since you’ve just declared a disorderly moratorium, negotiating for fiscal support from the people you’ve just defaulted on is perhaps going to be a little bit difficult. Not wholly impossible I suppose – as Greece still maintains the threat of Euro exit, which would be considerably more inconvenient for them – but very difficult. You’ve also got the anti-stimulative effect of the internal devaluation to think about, so from the perspective of the Greek people, this is still going to look and feel a lot like austerity, combined with the humiliation of default.”

“I don’t like this plan. It does reduce debt levels, but in a needlessly swashbuckling way that is likely to cause as many problems as it solves. Quite apart from anything, we would need a subsidiary plan to reconstruct the Greek banking sector. I will submit it under your name, but I have little hope that it will prove acceptable to either the Greek or the Troika side”.

You might have heard him muttering an insult under his breath as he walks out, but you might have been mistaken.

THE END

Fy og faen.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=34x6m-ahGIo

OK.
Det angår Hellas forstår jeg. Turner med en gang og sier CAN NOT BE BOTHERED. Vurderer å slenge på Den Store etter navnet mitt og rødde litt orntli opp nedi der igjen.

1:
You are sitting in an office with your advisor, Maynard. You have been asked to come up with a workable solution for the troika and for Greece, which needs to be politically and economically acceptable to both parties. Maynard’s job is to take your ideas and turn them into a proper proposal to be submitted. He has a long list of decisions for you to make. “First of all”, he says, “we need to decide whether there is any more money on the table. Do you think that Germany (and Netherlands, Finland, etc) can sell any more fiscal transfers to Greece, given their domestic politics?”
If you answer “Yes, I know it’s going to be difficult, but we have to plan on that basis”, turn to 32.


32:
“I’m sure you know what you’re doing”, Maynard says, with perhaps a flicker of sarcasm. “At some point in this process, we may have to start thinking about exactly how much, but let’s put that to one side for the time being. The next decision relates to the Greek current account. Are we going to aim to bring it roughly into balance?”

14.
If you answer “I don’t think current account balance is a realistic aim. Greece is going to need structural fiscal transfers, like Alabama or Wales”, turn to 48.


14:
“That’s definitely a significant adjustment”, Maynard warns you. “Since Greece ran large structural deficits (which were the counterpart to its fiscal deficit) for most of the 00s, we are basically saying here that we can’t return to the pre-crisis consumption path. This isn’t really a growth-oriented or cyclical policy; we’re trying to smooth the transition to a structurally lower standard of living in Greece. Just to be sure you know that, because it is going to factor into the political decisions later on”.

“I understand”, you answer. “But let’s deal with that later. We need to consider our debt strategy. My proposal is …”

If you say “That part of the fiscal contribution is going to have to take the form of a significant further reduction in the debt by the official sector, over and above the private sector contribution already made”, turn to 39.


39:
“Right”, says Maynard, pouring two cups of tea. “That’s the meat of the package right there. Now – are we putting together a plan which involves Greece staying in the Euro?”

If you answer “Yes, definitely”, go to 4.


4:
“So to summarise, we’re going to look for a degree of further debt relief but keep Greece in the Euro and try for rough current account balance over the long term”, Maynard says. “So this is an internal devaluation strategy, right?”

If you answer “No, you don’t understand at all”, go to 7.


7: “So, if not internal devaluation, what? Are you sure you want to have current account balance as one of your aims?”, Maynard asks.

If you want to reconsider this, go back to 32

“Ok, we are gunning for long term equalisation of Greek competitiveness. So what’s the plan, Stan?”

If you answer “We need a five year plan. We can carry out structural reforms under the auspices of a tightly-drafted IMF program, with funding for capital investment. Clearly this means that Greece is giving up a lot of political independence, but maybe that’s not a bad thing”, go to 27.



27:
“It’s worth a try.” Maynard shrugs. “We negotiate down the debt, then put Greece into effective administration by the Euroland partners, aiming to restore competitiveness by investment. If it worked, it would be heroic. I do worry that you’re asking a lot from both sides, politically – don’t underestimate the national humiliation factor for the Greeks here, or the reluctance of the Germans to put so much money into what is effectively a regional development scheme. If it works, it certainly forms a strong basis for fiscal union. Maybe that will help sell it. I’ll go and get it typed up”.

As he leaves your office, he is whistling, “There May Be Trouble Ahead”.

THE END.

Og den vampyrfilmen lukter kalkun lang vei. Med stor K

Ja den ser kjempecheezy ut, men fy som jeg gleder meg til å se den alikevel!

Jeg ler og jeg LER av det! Fy og faen.
Speaking of vampyrer, jeg har sett tre Twilightfilmer nå. Og. Hold dere fast. Det er litt bedre enn jeg trodde. Ikke at det sier så mye. Vurderer å dra på kino for å se den siste.

Rpol-rape?

Desverre showly. Fremdeles ikke bra, men heller ikke avføring.

Det sa... hmmm nei.

Men utsagnene dine her på mølla har forverret seg betraktelig. Først vender du Hellas ryggen, også nå med "Team Edvard" T-skjorte. Tsk Tsk

Her er forøvrig mine svar:

You are sitting in an office with your advisor, Maynard. You have been asked to come up with a workable solution for the troika and for Greece, which needs to be politically and economically acceptable to both parties. Maynard’s job is to take your ideas and turn them into a proper proposal to be submitted. He has a long list of decisions for you to make. “First of all”, he says, “we need to decide whether there is any more money on the table. Do you think that Germany (and Netherlands, Finland, etc) can sell any more fiscal transfers to Greece, given their domestic politics?”

If you answer “Yes, I know it’s going to be difficult, but we have to plan on that basis”, turn to 32.


32:
“I’m sure you know what you’re doing”, Maynard says, with perhaps a flicker of sarcasm. “At some point in this process, we may have to start thinking about exactly how much, but let’s put that to one side for the time being. The next decision relates to the Greek current account. Are we going to aim to bring it roughly into balance?”

If you answer “There isn’t a sustainable solution which involves Greece structurally consuming more than it produces. We need to get the economy back into balance”, turn to 14.
If you answer “I don’t think current account balance is a realistic aim. Greece is going to need structural fiscal transfers, like Alabama or Wales”, turn to 48.


48:
“I think we’re scoring points for economic realism here, but storing up political difficulties for ourselves later”, Maynard says. “But let’s game this one out then. What’s the debt strategy?”

If you say “That the current process is a can-kicking farce. We should just plan for a straightforward default on the debt”, turn to 2.
If you say “That part of the fiscal contribution is going to have to take the form of a significant further reduction in the debt by the official sector, over and above the private sector contribution already made”, turn to 46.
If you say “That we have to find a solution within the constraints of the current nominal debt level. We’ve got a certain amount of private sector writedown, but there won’t be any more”, turn to 29


46:
“OK, we’re getting somewhere”, Maynard says. “A big writedown of the debt will help a lot in terms of the fiscal balance, and then we can move to talking about the level of the structural fiscal transfers. This is basically taking us toward fiscal union, so it can’t be done quickly, but I can see how it’s moving in the right direction. Do we have Greece staying in the Euro?”

If you answer “No, they leave the Euro”, go to 12.
If you answer “Of course, yes”, go to 38.


38:
“OK”, says Maynard, between sips of tea. “This is getting somewhere. Negotiated writedown within the euro and then … what?”

If you answer “An IMF program, to go alongside the structural current account financing”, go to 5.
If you answer “Big structural investment funding from the EIB or something similar, to offset the structural current account deficit”, go to 53


5:
“You’re going to take a lot of flak for this from some quarters, but it seems to me to be that you could do a lot worse”, says Maynard, finishing his tea. “In terms of consumption smoothing and reducing the fiscal adjustment, I don’t think you’ll do better – you’ve written down the debt and you’re getting structural current account funding. But there is not really much escaping from the fact that Greece is not going to get back to the levels of consumption (or more accurately, the gap between consumption and production) that it saw in the 2000s. A lot will depend on the gap between the maximum amount that is politically possible for the Eurocore to deliver in terms of fiscal transfers, and the minimum amount that is needed to prevent riots in Greece. Which is a parameter outside our control, unfortunately. But at least this plan sorts out the debt, and gets Euroland on the road to fiscal union. Let’s get it written up”.

THE END

Interessant hvordan alle havnet på vidt forskjellige plasser. På nr 38 ville jeg i en ideel verden ha valgt det andre alternativet og gått til 53, men jeg anså det for litt for urealistisk med tanke på hvordan Den Europeiske Sentralbanken har vært til nå.

PS: Skal også poste i pathfinder snart.

Unnskyld. Skal skjerpe meg :(
To poeng.