Sounds like we're using the same terms (objective and subjective) but meaning different things by them.  If anyone decides something, it's what I'd consider subjective, since changing the subject to something else (ie, changing "God decides..." to "Tycho decides...") will change the result.  God creating something doesn't make it subjective per se, but any choices He makes based on His own mental state/beliefs/views/values/etc. will be subjective (in the sense that I mean it).  This isn't a normative thing, just a descriptive one.  If God can make something good that used to evil just by saying "it's good now!" then it's subjective, because it's up to him.  He's not constrained by what's really true, he gets to decide it.  That's what I mean by subjective.

Put another way, if God decides what is good and what is evil, it's just like God saying "vanilla is the best flavor!"  It's His position, not something external to him.  On the other hand, if God saying "I've decided that this week murder is good!" doesn't actually make murder good, then it'd be objective, since it wouldn't be up to God (or anyone else) whether it was good or not.





True, but if we can't tell was is true, then we can't actually tell that God is living up to this standard.  If we're too blind to know good from evil, then we have no idea if God is good or evil (other than his own claim to be good, but an evil god could claim to be good too).

It boils down to this:  Either we're able to tell good from evil sufficiently to know if God is good or evil.  But if we are able to do that, we don't just need to trust him on it.  We can look at His actions and say "Ya know, God, ordering people to commit murder seems a bit evil to me."  You can say we just don't know enough to make that call, but in that case, we just don't know enough to know that God is good at all.

I'll have to read this later. I really don't have time for another long post today.

In your last couple of posts you've been discussing different definitions of subjective and objective, and it seems to me you have two different definitions of subjective in those posts. One is "something decided by someone (even God) is subjective" and the other is "something that varies between different people is subjective." God fixing morality and making it the same for all people would fit the first defn of subjective, but not the second.

While I've made it clear that I reject (2.), I can't accept (1.) without a less ambiguous definition of subjective.

"Objective" means it is objective within a framework.  So within the framework of God's creation, things are objective, just like Newtonian physics works inside a Newtonian framework, but may not apply at the Quantum level.  That does not make them any less "objective."

Subjective means they depend totally upon an individual or group making a determination for itself.  The idea that the world is flat would be a subjective opinion (and one that we can refute because the reality is that it is not subjective, just like the First Principles I mentioned).

Actually, the difference is that something objective is true, regardless of who believes in it.  So, an objective moral would still be "good", even if nobody believed it was true.  Now, I'm not saying such a thing cannot exist, but no one has provided any examples of something that's good even though nobody accepted that concept.

Okay, sounds like the terms "objective" and "subjective" are causing trouble again, because they mean different things to different people.  I thought I had made it pretty clear what I had meant back in my long post when I first got back, but it seems not, so I suggest we avoid the terms as much as possible, and just replace them with whatever it is we mean by them.

Basically, I'm saying morality is "inside our minds," rather than "outside of anyone's mind."  It's conceptual, not part of the non-conscious part of the universe.  There aren't physical particles of good or evil, their aren't waves of goodness or evilness, nor anything like that.  What this mean is that unlike things like gravity, the non-conscious portion of the universe doesn't react to evilness or goodness.  The part of the universe that reacts to whether your actions are "good" or "evil" is the conscious part (ie, other people, and God, should He exist).  And they react because they have opinions (or "thoughts" or "beliefs" or other similar terms if you prefer) about your actions.  And that's all "evil" and "good" really are.  The thing that actually "exists" are those opinions about your actions, and they exist entirely in someone's mind.

Their opinions are not "true" or "false" in a real sense, because they're not about what is, but about what ought to be.  When you say "Jack is 10 feet tall," that's describing physical reality, and is either true or false.  When you say "Jack ought to be nice to Jill," you're describing what you want to be true, not what is true, and thus its not something that's really true or false.

Moral statements tend to involve worlds like "ought" or "should" (or often things like "right" or "evil", but those can be translated into equivalent statements using "ought" or "should"), which express a persons preference or desire about how the world should be, rather than telling us something about how the world really is.

Even if it's God tell us what He wants, He's still talking about His desires for how He wants the world to be, and those desires exist in his mind.

People seem to be a bit caught up on the idea that if our values are based purely on personal preferences (rather than something universally true), then we can't take any action at all, and would just have to sit down and do nothing.  To show this is incorrect I need to find an example of people taking action on something we all agree is based purely on personal preference.  An example of this which I remembered this morning is the "New Coke" finagle of the 1985.

For those too young to remember this, in 1985 Coke decided to change its recipe for CocaCola.  It called the new version "New Coke", and intended to get rid of the previous recipe altogether.  This led to a massive backlash from consumers, and a major letter-writing campaign to bring back "CocaCola Classic".  For a while Coke produced both products, but eventually stopped making New Coke altogether.

Now, hopefully we can all agree that whether you like old coke or new coke is purely a personal preference.  It's not an absolute truth of the universe that one is superior to the other (and somewhat ironically, in blind taste tests, new coke was usually found to be preferred, so to the degree that one really is better, it'd have to be new coke), it's just people's opinion.

And yet, despite it being just a matter of preference, and everyone know it was just a matter of preference, many many people felt strongly enough about it to write letters and eventually convince Coke to keep making old coke.  They didn't throw up their hands and say "well, I like the old one better, but that's just my preference, so their's no reason I should write a letter.  I mean, who am I to say that old coke is better?  It's not objectively true, so why should I even care which one I drink?"  Instead they wrote letters, expressed their opinions, and tried to change the minds of those in charge of one of the biggest multinational companies of the day.  It was purely, and unquestioningly just a matter of personal preference, and they still took action over it.

What this shows is that you don't need absolute truth on your side to take action.  You just need to have a preference.  It's not necessary that your personal preference be undeniably true in some universal sense.  All that's necessary is that it matters to you.

I'm not saying writing a letter to coke to bring back old coke is a weighty moral decision.  I had to pick something we could all agree was purely a matter of preference.  But it was something people took action over.  And that illustrates what I'm saying:  all that you need to take action is to care about something.  We like to tell ourselves that the things we take action over are universal and absolute truths, but this example shows that's not necessary.

Not accurate.  Objective can exist within a framework, particularly when it is doing with "right" and "wrong."  So something that is objectively right or wrong for a human is not necessarily so for a dog or cat, or God.

This is also recognized in law.  "Reasonableness" is considered an "objective" standard for what is reasonable.  But we can limit that framework to "reasonable woman" or "reasonable Black Man," etc.  For example, a reasonable Black person is likely to be offended by the N word, while a reasonable Asian who doesn't speak much English is not.  That doesn't make it any less objective; it just has to exist, as I said earlier, within a context and according to consequences, all of which can exist within a framework and still be objective.

Going with this example, subjective, on the other hand, would be that you only look at if the person is actually offended, without looking at whether it is reasonable or not for the person to be offended.  We do not typically use that standard in a legal analysis because it would create potential liability for almost any action.

To give a different example for Heath's refutation, Advil is objectively a safe and useful drug. The unstated framework there is 'for humans of a particular age and size range'. Advil is objectively poisonous. The unstated framework is 'for dogs or cats'.

The morality of humans does not apply to animals, who don't have the ability to understand or control their actions. When we're discussing 'objective morality', I think most people agree it's objective within the frameworks of humans, and no one is intending to arrest lions for murder.

Similarly, God is outside of the framework of humans, as He has a greater understanding of the results of actions than humans do, and who controls life and death, etc., etc.

The question Tycho asked is 'if God is outside of our framework to the point that we cannot understand or judge His actions, how do we know God is actually the good guy? It could be that God is the deceiver and some other character is actually the good and loving God.' I think this is a really valid question.

After all, according to the Bible, Satan (the deceiver) can speak with people, create what appear to be miracles and deliver good things to people, say the Lord's prayer, etc. All that Satan asks is unquestioning loyalty and faith. The only way to know Satan and to avoid him is through belief and guidance from God.

I have to imagine if Satan wrote the Bible, it would say almost the exact same thing (except names reversed, of course), and would be full of how much Satan gave up to save us, and how if we follow Satan he will give us treasures in the afterlife. The only requirement is unwavering faith and obedience in Satan.

So how do we tell the difference?

One other point which may concur a little with Tycho and draws on katisara's point above, is this:

The view of "subjective" morality is a sliding scale based on our own lack of omniscience.  Therefore, the rightness or wrongness of what we do as individuals may be different per individual (as with animals), but if we were omniscient, there would only be one right or wrong (i.e., it is ultimately objective).  This is the "context" and "consequences" I discussed above that must apply to moral discourse.

(I should also add "omnipotent" to that equation, because obviously if we cannot control our actions, the moral imperatives would fail to bind us for judgment purposes.)

In reply to Heath (msg # 417):

Okay, that really makes it clear to me that the terms "objective" and "subjective" are causing us confusion, because the example Heath gives (the "rational person" basis) would go firmly into the "subjective" category in the sense that I'm using term (since it's made up by people, it requires a judge, different judges will reach different conclusions, etc.).  So we should probably stick to avoiding those terms where possible, so as to avoid confusion.

In reply to katisara (msg # 418):

I'm with you that most people agree that morality doesn't apply to animals in the same way that it does to humans.  But, I would assert, that fits in better with my idea, that morality basically boils down to what we approve/disapprove of.  If there really were some absolute "principles" as Heath asserts that are "just like 1+1=2," it doesn't seem like they would just before humans.  Likewise for God.  If these rules really are absolute, "real" parts of the universe, rather than just expressions of one being or another's preferences, then it would seem to imply that they would apply to God just as much as to us.

And of course, as you point out, there is the issue that if we can't judge God's goodness by His actions, then we can't tell if He's good or evil or otherwise.


To go back a bit to where I think we were closer to being no the same page:
I'm asserting that morality boils down to approval or disapproval of actions by individuals.  It exists only in our minds (which isn't the same as saying it doesn't exist, or isn't important) and the minds of other conscious beings.  When we call something "evil" or "wrong" all that really means is that we really don't want someone to do it.  We often manage to convince ourselves that it means more than that, but there's no evidence to that being the case (at least that anyone has offered here; if anyone has any evidence, please speak up!).  BUT (and, as you can tell because it's in all caps, this is a big "but"), the fact that it's just what we approve or disapprove of DOES NOT mean we can't make moral decisions, or have to accept anyone's opinion as just as valid as our, or that we can't take actions based on our morals.  All we need to make more decisions is to care about something.  There's no laws of nature that make us all care about the same things (though we usually do have large areas of overlap due to having similar biology, experiences, etc.), so people can and do disagree about what they approve and disapprove of.  Nothing forces us all to care about the same things, and that's just the universe we exist in, for better or worse, and we need to deal with it.

To stress it further, saying that morality boils down to what individuals approve or disapprove of DOES NOT mean having to accept that everyone else's views are just as valid as mine.  Because I care about certain things, and have to make my decisions based on that.  Others care about other things, and will make decisions that I disagree with at times.  I not only can, but must decide how to react to that based on what I care about.  I can try to influence your views, but I can't control your actions.  I can only control my actions, and it will be my values that inform my decisions (though I may very well take into account what I guess other people will think of my actions).  The important point to note is regardless of whether or not this is what we want to be true, it's enough to explain what we see in the world, so there isn't a good reason (in my view) to assume there's more to it than that.  We may wish morality was all based on irrefutable principles that other just have to accept when we point them out, but wanting it to be true doesn't make it so.  If we want to know what is true about the universe, then we need to look at the universe.

No, that's not what I'm saying.  It is objective because there are not different judges; there are different judgmental standards based on individualized contextual limitations, and these can only be applied 100% correctly by an omniscient judge.  The underlying principles are objective.



I think again you are missing the context and consequence aspect of it.  You are looking at morals within the framework of physical science, not philosophical science.  Morals have to exist within a framework.  For example, in the 1+1=2 problem, the framework is the symbolism that 1 means "one," 2 means "two," etc.  If you freely allow someone to call a "1" a "2," then the mathematical equation also becomes subjective.  The framework here is the human experience, with each human being a different number.  If you start calling one human another human, then you are mixing up numbers.  But in the end, the context as applied to objective principles will always lead to the same "right," wrong," or "ought" answer.  Therefore, it is ultimately objective.  2+2=4; 3+3=6, etc.  But the only way we can incorporate the entire equation is to use infinite numbers -- that infinite number is the omniscience of God.  We cannot comprehend infinite; we can only put a number/symbol/value on it.

First of all, given that I am a reasonable Asian who speaks fluent English, I am offended by the use of the N word.  I am also offended by your assumption that any given Asian wouldn't speak much English.  Reasonableness be damned if you don't see the inherent racism in your statement.

Second, all you're describing is merely "context".  That doesn't change the objective reality of a statement, only the conditions in which it applies.  For example, all our laws of physics are known to break down at the point of singularity.  That doesn't mean they're not objectively true (nor, as katisara implies, does it make them untrue if we don't specify the conditions) just that the rule only applies in context.

Third, that still doesn't change the fact that in order for something to be objective, it has to be true *despite* the subjective beliefs about it.  For example, if there is a god, it must exist despite the beliefs of many that it does not exist, making it objectively real.  It doesn't matter if it only exists in Dimension 12, that's just the context.

Fourth, objective truths are somewhat different than objective morality.  In order to be moral, there must be a standard of good and bad (or evil, if you prefer).  In order for something to be objectively moral, there must be an objective standard of good and evil.  If you expect god to be good, then it must be bound by a code of morals; if you expect god to be objectively good, it must be bound by an objective code of morals.  And since it is bound (or limited, in other words) then you run afoul of omnipotence.

I would say that our laws of physics are definitely *not* objectively true. They are approximations of how the physical world operates, and some other intelligence might approximate the physical world differently.

Objectively true *in context*.  Newtonian physics might not be exactly correct, but that doesn't mean gravity has ceased to function.  Similarly, while a god might operate under different rules, that doesn't mean it must operate under no rules at all.

Nope, not even objectively true in context. Even in the ranges of size and speed it handles best, Newtonian physics is still an approximation.

I think hakootoko's point is closer to 'a freefalling object doesn't fall at 9.8m/s^2 ... it falls at 9.823874 .... ' and 'what we consider electrons and protons could be better explained by field theory or string theory or unnamed alien theory, which uses a completely different fundamental metaphor'.

You might say '2 + 2 = 4', while I say '|||| = - (-2 + -2)'

Gravity is the same for both of us, but the models, theories, and equations can be radically different. So are they objectively true?

Again, I stress that a large part of the problem here is entirely semantic.  People are using the same words, but meaning different things, which is really confusing the discussion.  I think we'll make much more progress if we accept that the meaning of "objective" and "subjective" has not been agreed upon, so if we use those terms, people aren't going to understand what we are trying to say.  To the extent that it's possible, I think we should try to avoid those terms for now.  That means using more words to describe what we actually mean, but I think that will help avoid confusion.

I think this is possibly a bit step in the right direction.  I have no idea what "philosophical science" is.  If that means something to you, let me know, and maybe I'll understand you better.  Also, while I wouldn't say I'm looking at things in terms physical science, I very much am asking for evidence in the real world.  Give me some evidence that I can test, that I can see out there in the real world.  If you cannot, I say that's very strong evidence in favor of my argument that morality exists in our minds.


What you're calling a "framework" here is purely semantic, though.  It has nothing to do with the truth or reality of 1+1=2.  It has to do only with our ability to understand it, and to communicate it to one another.  And the key point is that 1+1=2 regardless of how well we understand it, or whether we can communicate it or not.  It's something that's just true, and it doesn't depend at all on our "context".  You can't violate 1+1=2.  You can believe it's not true, you can change all the symbols around, you can say it in a different language, but the fact remains the same.  It doesn't need anyone to enforce it, because you simply can't violate it.  It applies to lions, humans, amoebas, and rocks alike.  This is very different from what you say about moral principles, because:
1.  we can (and do!) violate moral principles
2.  moral principles don't apply to everyone/everything (ie, its not wrong for a lion to hunt prey)
3.  we can't demonstrate or observer the moral principles in non-conscious reality.

You asserting that its just the same, but you're not dealing with these very real, and very important differences.  Saying "context!" doesn't help, and in facts just highlights what I'm saying, because 1+1=2 doesn't depend on context.


But again, 1+1=2 doesn't care one iota if we understand it or not.  It works the same for ants as it does for us.  The finiteness of our minds doesn't factor in to it.  It's part of the non-conscious portion of the universe, and we can test it and observe it.

Again, I think you're not really addressing the issues I'm raising.  In particular:
1.  You have not given any evidence or reasoning showing that these absolute, eternal principles exist.  You've asserted it several times, and tried to explain why it might look why they don't exist, but you haven't given any reasoning or evidence to make us believe that they do.  Show me something to change my mind, rather than just telling me I'm wrong.
2.  You haven't explained how the universe would be different if you were right, rather than me.  You're using a more complicated model, but it doesn't seem to have any additional predictive or explanatory power.  So why use/believe it rather the simpler model?

Let me try to highlight this with an analogy.  Let's imagine the universe came with a users manual that God has locked up in a box.  In this book are written all the principles you say exist.  But one else gets to look at the book.  No one other than God has ever seen it.  (this, to be clear, is the analogy for the fact that you say we can't see the principles ourselves because of our finite minds).  God has read the book, so knows the principles.  And He wants us to follow them, so He tells us the principles and says "please follow these principles or I'll be most displeased!"

That is more or less what you're saying we experience.  There are some principles, and they're really true, but we can't see them, so have to rely on God telling us what they are.  We'll call this case A.

Now imagine the exact same thing, but where God didn't get handed a book.  Instead, He just made up some principles Himself, wrote them in a book, then put it the box.  Again, He tells us what they are, and tells us to be sure to follow them.  We'll call this case B.

Now imagine a third case:  God did get a book, but decided He didn't like the rules, so locked the book up, told us it said something different than what it really did, and told us to follow what He said.  Call this case C.

Fourth situation:  There's no book at all.  God doesn't even bother writing a book, He just tells us there is one when there's not, and tell us what's in it, and to be sure to follow it.  Call this case D.

Observation:  In each case, we observe the exact same thing.  God says "I've got this book, and it has the following rules in it which I'd like you to follow..."  Furthermore, we have no way to telling which of the four cases is actually correct.  there's no test we can do to tell the difference between them, because the principles themselves (in the cases where they exist) don't have any actual impact; only God's reaction to our actions has an effect.  So all of the four cases look exactly the same to us, and we have no way of knowing which is true.  In such a situation, why believe there is a book at all?

The simple reaction is to say "well, cause God said there is one."  Fair enough, why do we think He'd tell us the truth?  "Well, because He's good, and wouldn't lie?"  How do we know that?  "Because He says so."  Hmm, that doesn't seem very satisfying, since any liar can claim to be telling the truth.  I think we need a better test.  "Well, lets look at His actions, and see if He's the type that'd lie?"  Okay, that seems better.  But how do we tell a liar by His actions, if we think His actions are mostly reported by Himself?  And even if we do accept the stories, He is depicted as ordering the murder of helpless women and children.  If He's willing to do that, it doesn't seem too unlikely that He'd also be willing to lie now and then.

So we don't know what's true.  And we cannot know what's true, because we only have these finite minds or whatever.  At best we can trust someone else (who's committed genocide and ordered murder), but even then we still have to make the decision, ourselves, based our own, limited knowledge whether or not to trust Him.  We have no choice but to make moral decisions without ever seeing what's written in the book (if it even exists!).

Now think about that for a moment:  Without access to the book, and with only our finite, imperfect minds, we not only can but must make moral decisions (even if we only make the single moral decision to trust God).  This shows that we have enough to make moral decisions without this book.  So again, why make the leap to assuming that this book necessarily exists?  The one thing that we can observe in the real world (us making moral decisions) doesn't require it.  All the data that we have from reality fit just fine with the theory that the book doesn't exist.  We've got a very simple model that explains all that we can observe, so why not accept it?

The answer, I think, is that people don't want it to be true that the book doesn't exist.  People would prefer that the book existed.  But this, I assert, is NOT a good reason to believe the book exists.  That's a sure ticket to leading yourself astray.  When we observe reality, it looks like the book doesn't exist.  The only good reason to believe the book does exist would be something in reality that doesn't match the no-book model.  But so far in this discussion no one has even tried to offer such a thing.  I feel like I'm the only one who thinks looking at reality is the right way to learn about reality.  To believe the book exists (ie, that these absolute, eternal principles exist), we need to see some evidence for them out in the real world.  Explanations of why we don't see them are all well and good, but they're not a good reason to believe in the principles in the first place.  Do people here not agree with this?

I don't think that's what Heath was saying at all, GMC.  He wasn't saying that any given Asian wouldn't speak much English, nor that no Asians would be offended by the N word.  He was saying that IF an asian person didn't speak much english, it wouldn't be unreasonable if they weren't offended by it (since they may not know what it means).

Yeah, for example, if I say "o-manko" to you, it probably does not offend you, but it can be an extremely vulgar word to the Japanese.  (Apologies to anyone who speaks Japanese here.)

Exactly.  Context doesn't affect the objective reality, merely its application.


Whether something exists is not "morality," since morality is a code of behavior.  Again, morality deals with "right," "wrong" or "ought," not "is" or "is not."  Therefore, it must described within that framework.  And my point is that morality is objective because it is based on unchanging First Principles.  It just applies differently based on context and consequences.

So, for example, the Holocaust was wrong regardless of what Hitler may have thought about it.  It is objectively wrong, and objectively immoral.  The First Principles on which the Holocaust were based were "wrong" and it "ought not" to have been done.  These facts exist independent of anyone's beliefs and are therefore objective.


This is what I am saying.  Morality is based on principles, not facts.  That is why it can appear to some people to be subjective when it is not.


You had me right up until the last sentence.  God is bound by morals by using His free will to be bound by them, not because he has to.  (And I would argue not because he created them, but others may reasonably disagree with that conclusion.)

Omnipotence is irrelevant.  Again, as I have stated, morals are bound in the "nature" of the thing.  If God's nature is ultimate good, then the morals he follows with his omnipotence obviously follow that nature and are moral.  He can choose wrong, but it is contrary to his Nature, contrary to the promises he has made, contrary to his understanding using his omniscience, and if anything, demonstrates that he is even more omnipotent because he can restrain himself to performing only acts that are moral.

In reply to Heath (msg # 430):

Ironically, this is one of the few words I remember japanese!  (My ex spent a semester in Japan and told a funny story about translating various words with japanese students involving that one).

[emphasis added by Tycho]
Here you've asserted that it was wrong, and you've called that a fact.  I would agree that it was wrong, but would say that "it was wrong" just means "I disapprove of it" or "wish it wouldn't/didn't happen".  It sounds like you feel "it is wrong" means more than that.  Can you demonstrate it, or elaborate on what it means that we all really know/agree what they mean?




Here you're saying principles aren't facts.  I think this may be an important distinction which hasn't been clarified yet.  What do you feel is the difference between a fact and a principle?  I'm assuming 1+1=2 is a "fact," which would presumably explain why I've struggled to see how morality is "just like" 1+1=2, if they're actually two different things.  This may be the issue that's been throwing me off from understanding you, since the "just like" comment made me assume you felt principles were facts.  So if you can clarify the difference for me, I might be able to break through some of the trouble I've been having.

(also, in case you missed in the back-and-forth, my post #428 had some questions for you that might help us move the discussion forward)
This message was last edited by the GM at 20:52, Fri 10 Jan 2014.

I had another idea about this that might help people see what I'm saying.  I view calling something "evil" or "wrong," as pretty much equivalent to saying "you shouldn't do it."  I feel like other people here are trying to say that "it's wrong" is a reason for not doing something.  Heath mentioned the idea of starting with the 'first principle' of "do what's right," which seems like an unnecessary assumption to me, since I'd say labelling it "right" means you think you should do it, and no further principle is needed.

That probably isn't very clear, so I'll try an example to make it clearer:
Punching someone in the nose for a laugh.  I'd call it wrong, because I don't think you should do it.  I don't think you should do it because it harms the other person without providing much benefit (I could go into that further, but I'll assume for now that other people will accept that I've got reasons for being opposed to this).  Heath, perhaps, might go about it the other way around, and say you shouldn't do it because it's wrong.

So far it seems like we're both saying more or less the same thing, but lets take it a step further, and ask Heath why we should care that its wrong.  He might say "well, you should have the first principle of doing what's right, and not doing what's wrong."  But then we could ask "Really, I don't really have that 1st principle.  Why should I?"  To which, I'm proposing, he might be a bit stuck.  He could say "er, well, you just do!  Its the first principle!" but we could just shrug our shoulders and say "don't care, not really much for principles, sorry."  Alternatively, he could say "well, if you don't hold that first principle you're an evil person!" to which someone might reply "if you say so, what's so bad about that?"  And again Heath seems a bit stuck "er, you're just supposed to not want to be evil!  It's sort of the rules!"  And again, we might shrug and say "sorry, don't really go much for that rule."

My point here isn't that the shrugger is in the right here, but that Heath has no real way to convince him.  If the person doesn't make the arbitrary assumption that you should do "good" things rather than "evil" things, then you can't change their minds.  Now, in my case, where I say it's called evil because I think you shouldn't do it, and the reasons you shouldn't do it are X, Y, and Z, then it's possible that they'll be convinced by those reasons  They don't have to make any arbitrary assumptions about the superiority of good over evil, because in this case those are just labels, not axioms we require for our argument.

Now, it's still possible that the prospective nose puncher might not agree with my reasons either.  "Nope, sorry man, I just don't care about X, Y, and Z."  But at least I've had a chance to change his mind, whereas Heath just as to insist that the person should by assumption.

Now, at this point both Heath and I have tried all our persuasion, and failed to convince the fellow.  So we might move on to consequences.  In my cases, I would say "Okay, you didn't care about X, Y, and Z, but I want you to know that I and many other people disapprove of you punching someone in the nose, and may treat you differently in the future."  This may, or may not convince him, but it is, in my argument, the result of doing an evil thing: people will react.

Now, Heath might make the same argument (in which case, he's bolstering my case), or he might claim that there is some other effect beyond people disapproving.  So far he hasn't said what that is.  Maybe gravity is stronger on people who do evil acts, and thus they'll have a harder time the rest of their life.  Or maybe it rains more on evil people, or whatever.  If he can make such a claim, he's got a good reason to back up his "don't do evil things!" assumption.  But if he can't, and the only thing that he can say will happen if you do do evil things is that other people (and maybe God) will react, then he's making the same argument as I am.  Which means the only real reason he can offer for why someone should do right rather than wrong, is that others will react.  In that case, it would seem that I am correct, and that labelling something "evil" just means "don't do it because I (and others) will disapprove."  I suppose it also implies not just that we think you shouldn't do it, but also that we want you to disapprove of it too, though that's perhaps finer detail than is necessary at the moment.

Put shortly, the "labelling something evil means we disapprove of it," model gives us an answer when someone asks "why should I do good instead of evil?"  The alternative, it seems, is to have to require an arbitrary assumption with no reason to back it up.    In that case, if someone doesn't share your assumption, you can't change their mind, because your position rests on that assumption.

Now, I'm not arguing that the person has to listen to your reason.  It may well be that they don't care if people react to their actions.  But at least you have a logical case to make, rather than just having to assert it as fact without any logic to back it up.